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Abstract
Comparative literature suggests that campaigning efforts impact positively, both in terms of mobilization and turnout.
Effects are not uniform. They may be affected by the electoral system, the electoral circumstances and the
effectiveness of party management. Studies of district level (constituency) campaigning in Britain have identified two
important trends. First, that effective targeting is a core component of a successful district campaign strategy and that
parties have become better at targeting resources. However, a question has arisen as to whether increasingly ruthless
partisan targeting by parties could have detrimental effects on overall levels of turnout. Second, they have shown how
campaign techniques are continuously being modernized but that more traditional labour-intensive campaigning tends
to produce stronger electoral payoffs. This article considers three questions in respect of the impact of district level
campaigns on turnout: whether the combined campaign efforts of the three principal parties in Britain are associated
with higher levels of turnout; whether the different campaigning styles of parties affect levels of turnout equally; and
whether the campaigning efforts of different parties have differential effects on turnout and whether intense partisan
targeting impacts upon turnout overall. We show that while campaigning boosts turnout, the impact varies by
campaign technique and by party.
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Introduction
A significant comparative literature suggests that cam-
paigning efforts by political parties impact positively, both
in terms of mobilization and turnout. The most detailed
studies suggest that campaigning efforts at local (most
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commonly, district) level are particularly effective, with
voters responding positively to contact. This is shown
in experimental studies (see, for example, Gerber and
Green, 2000), large-scale comparative analyses based
on survey responses (see, for example, Karp et al.,
2007) and several individual country studies (see, for
example, Carty and Eagles, 1999; Hillygus, 2005; Marsh,
2004), particularly in Britain, where a variety of indica-
tors, both at the individual and aggregate levels, has been
employed, demonstrating that more intense campaigning
activity at district level delivers electoral payoffs for par-
ties (Clarke et al., 2004, 2009; Denver and Hands, 1997;
Denver et al., 2003; Fieldhouse and Cutts, 2009; Fisher
et al., 2011a; Johnston, 1987; Johnston and Pattie, 2014;
Pattie et al., 1995; Whiteley and Seyd, 1994; Whiteley
et al., 2013).
However, these effects are not uniform. In comparative
analyses, Karp et al. (2007) show that effects may be
mediated by the electoral system used. They find that cam-
paigning in candidate-based systems is more likely to
mobilize voters than in party-based systems. Fisher et al.
(2011a) further show that the impact of campaign effects
will vary over time within the same candidate-based system
as a function of the marginality of an election, the likeli-
hood of significant change in the composition of govern-
ment, the number of seats targeted by individual parties
and the effectiveness of the central management of district
level campaigns. This is mediated significantly by the
popularity of parties and whether or not they are part of the
incumbent government. From the parties’ perspective,
there are clear electoral benefits to be had from campaign-
ing intensively in the places where their efforts are most
likely to yield payoffs. What is perhaps less clear is the
impact of these campaigns on turnout. We might expect
that more intense campaigning will boost turnout overall,
mobilizing voters wherever campaigning takes place. How-
ever, this becomes a particularly interesting question under
the ‘first past the post’ or single member plurality electoral
system used for Westminster elections, as the logic of dis-
trict level campaigning is that parties should rationally
focus their efforts principally in those seats where they can
reasonably expect to deliver electoral payoffs. As Karp
et al. (2007: 92) predict: ‘parties will expend greater effort
on mobilizing voters when the expected benefits of turning
out voters are greatest, relative to cost’. And this is broadly
what occurs, although this does not imply that citizens in
safe seats are completely ignored. Indeed, Karp et al.
(2007: 102) find that levels of party contact in safe seats
in countries with single member districts still exceed those
in countries utilizing a system of proportional representa-
tion. Notwithstanding, parties in Britain generally cam-
paign most in their target seats (those that they are
seeking to defend or capture), somewhat less in those seats
that they comfortably hold and even less in those seats
where there is no realistic chance of victory (Fisher et al.,
2011a; Johnston and Pattie, 2014). The realization in the
rational distribution of parties’ campaign efforts varies
somewhat, with the Conservatives generally being less suc-
cessful, but over time all three parties that contest seats in
Britain have moved towards this kind of distribution of
effort.
While this is true for campaign strength overall, inten-
sity in differing campaigning styles may not be distributed
so effectively. Broadly speaking, we can identify three
approaches to district level (constituency) campaigning:
traditional, modern and e-campaigning. Traditional cam-
paigning is labour intensive, including doorstep canvas-
sing, ‘knocking up’ of voters on polling day and the
distribution of leaflets and posters. Modern campaigning
includes the use of computers, telephones and direct mail
to contact voters. E-campaigning focusses upon contacting
voters through social media, email and text message. Fisher
and Denver (2009) show that modern campaign efforts are
more likely to be distributed effectively compared with tra-
ditional ones, which depend to an extent on the mobility of
party volunteers between seats and also on the human,
financial and other resources available locally. Slightly
different patterns are, however, associated with forms of
e-campaigning, where differentiation of campaign effort
by the electoral status of the seat is much less pronounced
(Fisher et al., 2011b).
Notwithstanding, the overall result, as predicted, is that
the most intense activity where two or more parties are tar-
geting their efforts takes place in only around 160 seats of
the current 632 in Great Britain. As a consequence, we
might expect that as the parties become better at focussing
their campaign efforts in order to deliver electoral payoffs
(which includes raising funds locally for some of the activ-
ities), then overall levels of turnout may be differentially
affected as most seats are not subject to intense competition
and the positive effects of voter mobilization. Equally, we
may find that different parties’ campaigns have a differen-
tial impact on turnout, reflecting their relative success at
distributing campaigning resources effectively to maxi-
mize electoral payoffs. Previous detailed analyses on
these topics (such as Denver and Hands, 1997) are, how-
ever, relatively brief, with the vast majority of studies not
differentiating by party. In this article, therefore, we
address three questions using data from the 2010 British
General Election. First, we consider whether the com-
bined campaign efforts of the three principal parties in
Britain at district level are associated with higher levels
of turnout. Second, we examine whether the different
campaigning styles of parties affect levels of turnout
equally. Finally, we examine whether the campaigning
efforts of different parties have differential effects on
turnout and whether intense partisan targeting does indeed
impact upon turnout.
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Data sources
The data used to capture campaign effort in these analyses
are twofold. First, we use a survey of electoral agents1 car-
ried out immediately after the 2010 election, designed to
capture the many different aspects of campaigns: prepara-
tion, organisation, humanpower, use of computers, polling
day activity, use of telephones, use of direct mail, canvas-
sing, use of leaflets and e-campaigning. Campaign intensity
indexes are calculated using a Principal Components Anal-
ysis (PCA) of all these core indicators of constituency cam-
paigning as defined theoretically (see Appendix for
variables included in each index).2 Using conventional
cut-off criteria, the PCAs suggest one factor is sufficient
to represent the variance in the original variables (Fisher
et al., 2011a: 827). The survey delivers the most compre-
hensive and accurate indicator of campaign intensity. How-
ever, despite good response rates overall (54%), there are
data gaps when requiring responses from all three main par-
ties in the same seat. Analyses are carried out on those seats
where data are available for all three parties but, of course,
this produces the possibility of selection bias.
As a check, therefore, we also employ a second data
source as a surrogate for campaign intensity: candidate
spending.3 The analysis of candidate spending is not con-
strained by response rates. Declaration of spending is
required by law and the returns are published by the Elec-
toral Commission. Thus, near complete spending data are
available for almost all candidates. Candidate spending
does not, however, capture free volunteer effort which, as
Fisher et al. (2014) show, can have significant independent
effects. However, it is a useful surrogate with which to con-
firm results from the agent survey where analyses are lim-
ited by case availability. Indeed spending in previous
elections has been shown to be highly correlated with other
indicators of overall campaign intensity (Fieldhouse and
Cutts, 2009), though in 2010 the correlation was less strong
(Fisher et al., 2014). In addition, candidate spending data at
the 2010 election offered a more detailed picture than in
previous elections due to an extended regulated period of
four months. In previous elections, data were only available
for the regulated period between dissolution and the elec-
tion (or, prior to the Political Parties, Elections and Refer-
endums Act 2000, from the point at which a candidate was
adopted). The Political Parties and Elections Act 2009,
however, extended the regulated period. The period from
dissolution to polling day remained regulated and was
known as the ‘Short Campaign’. In addition, the period
from January 1st 2010 to dissolution was now also regu-
lated – known as the ‘Long Campaign’ (see Johnston
et al., 2011 for details). To capture as full a picture of cam-
paign intensity represented by candidate spending as possi-
ble, therefore, we use the candidates’ proportion of the
maximum permitted expenditure in their constituencies
over both regulated periods (‘Long’ and ‘Short’), thus
capturing costed activity over a period of four months prior
to the election.
The impact of combined levels of campaigning
on turnout
Our first question asks whether the combined campaign
efforts of all three parties had a positive effect on turnout
in the local constituency. We model this using OLS with
percentage turnout for each constituency in 2010 as the
dependent variable. Our preferred control variable is turn-
out at the previous election. While turnout does not corre-
late across constituencies between elections as strongly as
party performance, its use does at least capture the many
demographic factors that may contribute to higher or lower
levels of electoral performance. However, previous turnout
may also be a proxy for previous campaigns. There is a
potential danger, therefore, of ‘over-controlling’ in our esti-
mates. Notwithstanding, the employment of turnout at the
previous election provides a conservative estimate of the
marginal effect of the campaign, over and above any previ-
ous campaigns. Its use in this election, however, presents
some complications; there were extensive boundary
changes between the 2005 and 2010 general elections in
England and Wales, though not in Scotland.4 As a result,
there are no directly comparable turnout data available.
There are, however, notional turnout data which, while not
perfect, do represent a useful test of the robust nature of our
results.5
We examine the impact of campaigning on turnout with
two separate tests. The first uses constituencies where we
have campaign intensity scores for all three parties. Inevi-
tably, this results in a restriction on the number of cases,
and we are limited to 102. The second test uses candidate
spending as a surrogate variable. This provides data in
619 of the 630 total cases.
The results for both tests are shown in Table 1 and,
despite the different numbers of cases, the results are very
similar.6 The combined campaign intensity and candidate
spending models have a positive and statistically significant
effect on turnout. Thus, there is a good overall case that cam-
paigning produces positive benefits not only for the parties
themselves but also for the health of the elections. By and
large, the more campaigning the parties engage in overall,
the more voters in general are mobilized. Unfortunately,
over time, the parties have confined their intensive cam-
paigning (as measured by candidate spending) to a smaller
number of constituencies, in many of which they are spend-
ing less than two decades earlier (Johnston and Pattie, 2014).
The impact of campaigning styles on turnout
Our measure of campaign intensity captures a whole range
of techniques employed by parties and provides the best
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representation of party effort. Inevitably, campaign tech-
niques evolve over time as new technologies become avail-
able (and, critically, affordable) and local parties adjust to
varying levels of available volunteer effort (Fisher and
Denver, 2009). An indicator of such a change is reflected
in the constituency campaigning literature. The 1992 elec-
tion was, for example, dubbed ‘the fax election’ by Denver
and Hands (1997). The notion of the fax being the pinnacle
of technology seems faintly comical today, but illustrates
that over a relatively brief period of time the emphasis in
campaign techniques does change. Fisher and Denver
(2008) show this has occurred for all parties; the 2001 elec-
tion was the ‘tipping point’ when more modern campaign
techniques using telephones and targeted direct mail
became more prevalent than traditional labour-intensive
techniques such as doorstep canvassing and hand-
delivered leaflets. By 2010, parties increasingly deployed
e-campaigning, reflecting the wider availability and acces-
sibility of such technology (Fisher et al., 2011b).
As new campaign styles develop, which campaign styles
are most effective at influencing electoral outcomes? Com-
parative evidence suggests that more traditional forms of
labour-intensive campaigning still have the stronger
impact. Gerber and Green (2000: 661), for example, found
that face-to-face campaigning was more likely to stimulate
turnout than direct mail (see also Arceneaux and Nicker-
son, 2009), while Aldrich et al. (2013) argue that in general
face-to-face is more likely to yield payoffs. Similarly, there
is strong evidence in Britain of greater voter responsiveness
to more traditional doorstep campaigning (Fisher, 2011;
Fisher and Denver, 2009; Fisher et al., 2014; Pattie and
Johnston, 2003). However, the intensity of use of different
techniques is intertwined. Thus, evidence from Britain
shows that parties that run extensive campaigns based on
traditional methods also tend to adopt extensive ‘modern’
approaches such as telephone canvassing and direct mail.
E-campaigns are slightly different, with less discrimination
in the level of their use depending on the seat’s strategic
importance, a function both of the relative low cost of the
technology and parties’ lower prioritization of these tech-
niques (Fisher et al., 2011b).
Overall, this presents some challenges in measuring the
differential impacts of differing campaign styles relative to
each other on turnout, since no campaign will rely exclu-
sively on one approach and inevitably there is some ‘leak-
age’ of effects from other campaigning styles, making it
difficult, if not impossible, to completely isolate individual
effects. This can be partly mitigated if models are run sep-
arately rather than including traditional, modern and e-
campaigning all in the same model. As with the overall
measure of campaign intensity, we capture the differing
campaign styles through a Principal Components Analysis
of a series of items. The scores for each party are combined
to produce an overall score of intensity for these three
approaches.7 As with the analysis of overall campaign
intensity in Table 1, we model the impact on percentage
turnout in 2010 using OLS, while controlling for notional
turnout in 2005 (Table 2). Three models are run for each
campaign style using seats where we have scores for all
three parties. All analyses have the potential risk of selec-
tion bias though, as Table 1 suggests, this may not be a par-
ticular problem.
Analyses of constituencies where there are scores for all
three parties show that the combined levels of both tradi-
tional and modern modes of campaigning are associated
with higher levels of turnout whereas e-campaigning, while
positively signed, has no statistically significant effect
(Table 2). This may be partly explained by the relative lack
of targeting employed in e-campaigning (Fisher et al.,
2011b), but also suggests that in Britain, at least,
e-campaigning has some way to go before it has a major
impact on electoral outcomes (see also Gibson and Canti-
joch, 2011). As Fisher et al. (2014) show, despite the
growth in campaigning styles that incur cost, the more tra-
ditional approaches conducted by free, volunteer labour
still have a greater propensity to deliver electoral impact.
The impact of individual parties’ campaigns
on turnout
Our third question examines the impact of individual par-
ties’ campaigns on turnout. As Table 1 showed, campaign-
ing overall is associated with higher turnout, but is this
true for all parties – particularly as some are more effective
at targeting their efforts than others? A party that was
ruthless in focussing partisan effort on target seats could
Table 1. The impact of the combined campaigns on turnout.
All Three Parties (Intensity) All Three Parties (Spend)
B S.E. Sig B S.E. Sig
Constant 33.303 4.284 ** 22.295 1.303 **
Campaign Intensity 0.561 0.233 * 0.017 0.003 **
Notional Turnout 2005 0.543 0.068 ** 0.680 0.022 **
Adj. R2 0.399 0.647
n 102 619
**p < 0.01; *p < 0.05.
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theoretically depress turnout overall since, inevitably, most
seats will not be targeted and therefore fewer voters will be
exposed to the mobilizing effects of intense campaigns. We
examine this question first by running the model using only
those seats where we have campaign intensity scores for all
three parties (Table 3). We run two versions of the model:
the first without a control variable, the second using
notional turnout in 2005 as a control. Since most demo-
graphic predictors of turnout are also associated with par-
ties’ own electoral fortunes it makes sense to run both
models and compare results.
The first results offer interesting findings. In both mod-
els, Conservative campaign intensity is associated with
higher levels of turnout. Liberal Democrat campaigning
has a similarly positive effect in the second model. The
results for Labour, however, are more intriguing. In both
models, Labour campaigning is associated with lower lev-
els of turnout to a statistically significant degree. The anal-
yses in Table 3 are based only on a limited number of
constituencies, again raising the possibility of selection
bias. Thus, Table 4 repeats Table 3’s analyses but using the
surrogate measure of candidate spending. The findings pro-
duced with the limited number of cases in Table 3 are
broadly replicated. Both Conservative and Liberal Demo-
crat campaigning is associated with higher levels of turn-
out, but not campaigning by Labour candidates which, as
in Table 3, is associated with lower levels of turnout.
Where no controls are used, this finding is statistically sig-
nificant. When controlling for previous notional turnout,
the coefficient is negatively signed, but fails to reach statis-
tical significance. This suggests that, at best, Labour cam-
paigning had no positive impact on turnout.
Overall, both tests, despite the limitations of the avail-
able cases for the preferred measure of campaigning and
the employment of a surrogate measure, tell a very similar
story. First, these tests, and those in Table 1, show that
more intense constituency campaigning was associated
with higher levels of turnout at the 2010 general election.
Second, this positive impact was shared at the individual
party level by the Conservatives and Liberal Democrats.
Third, Labour campaigning apparently either depressed
turnout at the 2010 general election or at least had no sig-
nificant effect upon it, raising the obvious question of why
Labour’s campaigns should have differential effects on
turnout compared with the other two parties.
One possible explanation returns to the impact of partisan
targetingwhich represents entirely rational party behaviour in
a first past the post system. The logic is straightforward – a
rational party should focus its campaigning resources princi-
pally on those seats it needs to win to achieve its overall
electoral goals. There is clear, comparative evidence
for such a prediction. Karp et al. (2007: 98–99) show, for
example, that parties in general are consistently more
likely to target voters inmarginal districts than in safe ones.
Table 3. The impact of separate parties’ campaigns on turnout using campaign intensity.
Without Controls With Notional Turnout 2005
B S.E. Sig B S.E. Sig
Constant 66.041 0.534 ** 38.382 4.131 **
Conservative 1.173 0.528 ** 1.284 0.444 **
Labour –1.743 0.484 ** –0.966 0.488 *
Lib Dems 0.848 0.507 n.s. 0.834 0.420 *
Notional Turnout 2005 N/A 0.450 0.067 **
Adj. R2 0.253 0.486
n 102 102
**p < 0.01; *p < 0.05.
Table 2. The impact of campaigning styles on turnout.
E-Campaigning Traditional Campaigning Modern Campaigning
B S.E. Sig B S.E. Sig B S.E. Sig
Constant 33.425 4.380 ** 32.118 4.344 ** 33.236 4.325 **
E-Campaigning 0.297 0.244 n.s. n/a n/a
Traditional Campaigning n/a 0.479 0.230 * n/a
Modern Campaigning n/a n/a 0.450 0.230 *
Notional Turnout 2005 0.539 0.070 ** 0.563 0.070 ** 0.545 0.069 **
Adj. R2 0.373 0.402 0.387
n 102 102 102
**p < 0.01; *p < 0.05.
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If we disaggregate targeting effects by party, analyses of
the 2010 election in terms of measuring the impact of cam-
paigning on electoral payoffs suggested that Labour’s tar-
geting was most effective in terms of delivering payoffs,
that the Conservatives’ was improved relative to previous
elections, and that the Liberal Democrats targeted less effec-
tively than in previous elections (Fisher et al., 2011a). Thus, if
partisan targeting is effective, we would expect the positive
impact of campaigning on overall turnout to be diminished.
Equally, if partisan targeting is less effective, then thepositive
benefits of campaigning on turnout are likely to be apparent
across a larger number of districts.
We test whether parties’ targeting efforts impact upon
turnout in Table 5, using candidate spending data to maxi-
mise the number of cases, and using interaction terms of
campaign efforts in target seats alongside the overall cam-
paign efforts, plus a dummy variable capturing the target
status of a seat.8 The model was run without controls, and
then controlling for notional turnout in 2005. The results
help explain the outcomes in Tables 3 and 4. First, there
is no effect of targeting on Liberal Democrat campaign-
ing’s impact on turnout, with the interaction term failing
to reach statistical significance. Second, the results for the
Conservatives similarly suggest that targeting also had a
minimal effect. Labour’s results, however, are different.
In both models, there is apparently a negative impact on
turnout as a result of Labour campaigning in non-target
seats. However, in target seats (145 in total) this negative
effect was attenuated, even though overall turnout was
lower in these seats.9
The apparent differential effects of Labour’s campaigns
are confirmed re-running the model using combined cam-
paign spending for candidates from the three principal
parties and creating an interaction term using a dummy
variable capturing whether or not two or more parties from
amongst the principal three targeted the seat. The model is
run controlling for notional turnout in 2005 and Table 6
shows that, overall, targeting did not have the effect of
depressing turnout overall, despite the potential for this to
occur under first past the post.
The interaction terms in Table 5 are easier to interpret if
we produce graphical representations to compare the
effects of different levels of candidate spending in target
and non-target seats. We use the second model, which
Table 4. The impact of separate parties’ campaigns on turnout using candidate spending.
Without Controls With Notional Turnout 2005
B S.E. Sig B S.E. Sig
Constant 62.443 0.400 ** 25.222 1.425 **
Conservative 0.101 0.008 ** 0.037 0.006 **
Labour –0.062 0.009 ** –0.010 0.007 n.s.
Lib Dems 0.025 0.008 ** 0.016 0.006 **
Notional Turnout 2005 N/A 0.632 0.024 **
Adj. R2 0.265 0.658
n 619 619
**p < 0.01; *p < 0.05.
Table 5. The impact of targeting on turnout using candidate spending.
Without Controls With Notional Turnout 2005
B S.E. Sig B S.E. Sig
Constant 62.723 0.467 ** 26.562 1.496 **
Conservative 0.125 0.010 ** 0.051 0.008 **
Labour –0.131 0.014 ** –0.035 0.011 **
Lib Dems 0.046 0.013 ** 0.043 0.009 **
Con Target 5.431 1.421 ** 1.734 1.014 n.s.
Lab Target –1.988 1.192 n.s. –1.043 0.843 n.s.
Lib Dem Target –1.689 1.664 n.s. –0.898 1.175 n.s.
Con Spend * Target –0.119 0.022 ** –0.040 0.016 **
Lab Spend * Target 0.120 0.024 ** 0.043 0.017 **
Lib Dem Spend * Target 0.000 0.028 n.s. –0.021 0.020 n.s.
Notional Turnout 2005 N/A 0.607 0.024 **
Adj. R2 0.339 0.671
n 619 619
**p < 0.01; *p < 0.05.
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controls for notional turnout in 2005. In Figures 1, 2 and 3,
we show a highly simplified scenario of turnout depending
on whether candidates spent 25%, 50% or 75% of the per-
mitted maximum and the spending of the two other parties
is held constant at 75%. In each figure there are two lines:
the projected impact of candidate spending on turnout in a
party’s target seats and the projected impact of spending in
its non-target seats.
Figure 1 shows that Conservative campaigning in both
the party’s targets and its non-targets had a positive impact
on turnout. However, in the vast majority of cases, there
was a more positive impact on turnout in the party’s
non-target seats than in its targets. Figure 3 for the Liberal
Democrats paints a similar picture – Liberal Democrat
campaigning boosted turnout across the board, but turnout
was consistently higher in the party’s non-target seats. The
results for Labour (Figure 2) show a different picture, how-
ever. Turnout in Labour target seats grew as Labour candi-
dates campaigned more, as we would expect. However, in
our simulation, the reverse is true in Labour’s non-target
seats – turnout fell as Labour candidates spent more of their
permitted allowance.10 Thus, Labour’s ruthless partisan
targeting had clear effects – it significantly boosted turnout
in seats Labour actively sought to win, but not elsewhere.
Empirically, it’s true that Labour spent less in 2010 where
notional turnout in 2005 was higher and that this could pro-
duce selection effects. However, we control for these by
adding notional turnout in 2005 to the models and find sim-
ilar results – a fall in turnout in Labour non-targets where
candidates spent more of their permitted maximum. The
puzzle, then, is why any form of campaigning should
apparently be associated with a decline in turnout.
At one level, there may be a simple, common sense
explanation. It could be, for example, that campaigning was
so poor or antagonistic to voters that they were discouraged
from voting. Gerber and Green (2000: 660), for example,
found that telephone canvassing had the effect of depres-
sing turnout (though see Imai, 2005 and Gerber and Green,
2005). And, Whiteley et al. (2013: 117) show that, unlike
the other two main parties, Labour’s campaign in general
was negatively evaluated by citizens – so that the more peo-
ple were made aware of Labour’s campaign in a
constituency the more turned-off it they became. However,
given that Labour campaigning in its target seats was asso-
ciated with higher turnout, we require an alternative expla-
nation to one rooted in the idea of antagonistic
campaigning. A more generalizable understanding can be
found if we return to the model of exogenous effects on
campaign success developed by Fisher et al. (2011a). They
Table 6. The impact of targeting on turnout using combined
levels of candidate spending.
B S.E. Sig
Constant 22.156 1.314 **
Combined Parties’ Spending 0.019 0.004 **
Target Seat 0.029 1.042 n.s.
Party Spend * Target –0.003 0.008 n.s.
Notional Turnout 2005 0.681 0.022 **
Adj. R2 0.646
n 619
**p < 0.01; *p < 0.05.
Figure 1. Conservative.
Figure 2. Labour.
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highlight a series of conditions to estimate the relative
effectiveness of parties’ campaign efforts (see Table 7).
For Labour, two particular conditions were pertinent in
respect of turnout – the party’s relative unpopularity in
2010 and the likelihood of significant change at the elec-
tion. Both conditions were likely to limit the effects of
Labour campaigning as the unpopular incumbent. Cer-
tainly, research using experimental methods has also shown
that campaign interventions are affected by the level of
popularity of the party (Arceneaux and Nickerson, 2009;
Hillygus, 2005; Niven, 2001). Equally, Karp et al. (2007:
95–96) suggest that where parties are not in a competitive
position, they may find it difficult to persuade potential vot-
ers to go to the polls, since their votes may be perceived as
making little difference to the outcome. They also note that
some voters are likely to be easier to contact than others,
with previous voters the most cost-effective for parties to
contact. Such conditions were particularly pertinent to
Labour in 2010. As an unpopular incumbent, its campaigns
in its non-target seats would probably only be focussed on
either existing Labour supporters or past Labour voters,
since the chances of capturing new voters in these seats
would be minimal; survey evidence shows that the parties
canvassing efforts in the last few months of the campaign
focus on their ‘known’ supporters and avoid mobilising
their opponents’ probable and possible voters (Johnston
et al., 2012). However, at the individual level, we find that
previous Labour voters and partisans were significantly
more likely to abstain in 2010 compared with those of the
other main parties. Denver et al. (2012: 18) show that
whereas 6% of both Conservative and Liberal Democrat
voters in 2005 abstained in 2010, the comparable figure for
Labour was 11%. Equally, if we compare abstention rates
of those with partisan identification in 2010 using the
British Election Study, we find that 11% of Labour parti-
sans abstained, while the same was true for only 4% of
Conservatives and 6% of Liberal Democrats (the differ-
ences being statistically significant).
The general explanation, therefore, is related to underlying
factors exogenous to campaigns: Labour was the unpopular
incumbent at an election where significant change was likely.
Under these circumstances, the Labour campaign was only
likely to mobilize Labour supporters in Labour’s non-target
seats and Labour supporters were more likely to abstain.
Such a finding is theoretically important, since it demon-
strates not only that campaigning will not have uniform
effects, but that it can be associated with negative effects,
not so much because the campaign actually discourages
participation, but because the circumstances are such that
in some seats the campaign will only appeal to a group of
voters who are disproportionately more likely to abstain.
So, Labour’s ruthless targeting and the exogenous
effects of being an unpopular incumbent may help to
explain the significant differentiation in turnout effects
between Labour target and non-target seats. However, one
further puzzle is why there was not a similarly stark differ-
entiation between the effects as a result of Conservative and
Liberal Democrat campaigning in those parties’ target and
non-target seats. Certainly, the Liberal Democrats were rel-
atively popular and while the Conservatives were not them-
selves overwhelmingly popular they were, nevertheless,
more popular than Labour (Fisher et al., 2011a). So, if this
was only a function of popularity, then we would expect the
impact of campaigning on turnout in those parties’ targets
to be higher than in their non-targets. But, by and large, that
is not the case (and in the case of the Liberal Democrats,
turnout in non-targets was consistently higher). The expla-
nation for this may again be related to the exogenous fac-
tors highlighted by Fisher et al. (2011a) – the high
number of target seats combined with less focussed varia-
tion in partisan targeting by the Conservatives and Liberal
Democrats. Certainly, analyses of electoral payoffs suggest
that these two parties were less successful than Labour in
this respect (Fisher et al., 2011a).
Figure 3. Liberal Democrats.
Table 7. Exogenous factors influencing likely effectiveness of
constituency campaigns.
More effective Less effective
Closeness of
election
Popularity
equilibrium
— Unpopular
party(ies)
Significant change
likely
Challenger(s) — Incumbent
High numbers of
target seats
Unpopular
party(ies)
— Popularity
equilibrium
Central
management
Clear
objectives
— Unclear
objectives
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Conclusions
Studies of district-level (constituency) campaigning in
Britain have identified two important trends. First effective
partisan targeting is a core component of a successful
constituency-level campaign strategy in terms of delivering
electoral payoffs so that, over time, political parties have
become better at raising and targeting resources where they
are needed most. While improvements in targeting have
helped ensure that all three principal parties’ campaigns
have delivered electoral payoffs, a question has arisen as
to whether increasingly ruthless, partisan-focused targeting
by parties could impact upon overall levels of turnout, the
reasoning being that the positive effects of campaigning on
voter mobilization might only be apparent in a minority of
seats. Second, they have shown how campaign techniques
are continuously modernizing but that, despite these
changes, more traditional, labour-intensive campaigning
tends to produce greater electoral payoffs, while noting that
as more modern techniques become widespread, voters are
becoming more receptive to them (Fisher and Denver,
2009). Similar citizen preferences for more traditional cam-
paign methods (in particular, face-to-face) have been found
in other democracies (Aldrich et al., 2013; Gerber and
Green, 2000), though few suggest, as Fisher and Denver
(2009) do, that responsiveness may grow with familiarity
(though see Imai, 2005, who similarly suggests that tech-
niques such as phone calls may produce positive results,
and Aldrich et al., 2013, who show that US citizens are
increasingly comfortable with online contact).
This article addressed three questions. The first was
whether combined levels of campaign effort continued to
mobilize voters and the evidence was clear: in aggregate
terms, more intense constituency-level campaigns boosted
turnout overall in 2010 – the campaigns mobilized voters.
The second question was whether the differing forms of
campaigns that parties now employ had any differential
impact on turnout. The evidence suggested that, in line with
studies of different campaign techniques on electoral pay-
offs, more traditional campaigning was associated with
higher levels of turnout as well. Moreover, as suggested
by Fisher and Denver (2009), voters are becoming more
receptive to modern campaign techniques and by 2010 it
appears that their use also had a positive impact on voter
turnout. With the newest campaign development of
e-campaigning, however, there is at present no evidence
of a positive impact on turnout. As Fisher at al. (2011b)
suggest, despite the hyperbole surrounding the use of
e-campaigning in 2010, the reality is that its electoral
effects are currently minimal compared with more estab-
lished practices.
The final question asked whether individual parties’
campaigns boosted turnout to similar degrees. The evi-
dence suggested that while both Conservative and Liberal
Democrat campaigns were associated with higher levels
of turnout, the same was not true for Labour’s campaign,
which was poorly resourced compared with that of the Con-
servatives. Such findings brought us back to our initial con-
cern of whether their targeting strategies, while delivering
electoral payoffs for the parties themselves, could have the
impact of depressing turnout overall through a lack of
mobilization in the majority of seats. Although this was not
the case for combined levels of campaigning, it appeared to
be so for Labour campaigns which boosted turnout in the
party’s target seats, but not elsewhere – thus at best contri-
buting no positive effect on levels of turnout overall. In one
sense, such a finding may be cause for concern. Labour has
for some elections been effective in its partisan targeting,
so the effects identified here are not surprising. The Con-
servatives should eventually become as effective (and
indeed, there are signs that they are ‘catching up’ with
Labour) and if that occurs (and Labour continues to be
effective in its targeting), the likely effect may be a decline
in turnout overall. However, we find that the marked differ-
ence in the impact of Labour campaigning on turnout in its
target and non-target seats is best explained through refer-
ence to Fisher et al.’s model of likely campaign effective-
ness. Thus the impact of party campaigning on turnout is
likely to vary by party over time, with significant interven-
ing variables being the level of popularity of the party and
whether they are the incumbent or challenger. Where a
party is unpopular, the variation in impact through targeting
is likely to be greater, since in non-target seats campaigns
will be focussed principally on the party’s core vote. And,
if that party’s supporters are disproportionately likely to
abstain rather than vote for one of the other parties, the out-
come in such seats is likely to be a fall in turnout overall.
The overall message is clear – campaigning boosts turnout.
The key concern becomes one of where that campaigning
takes place and under what exogenous circumstances. The
impact of campaigning is far from uniform and is strongly
influenced by electoral context, suggesting that compara-
tive analyses must not only disaggregate by country and
system type, but also by party.
Appendix
Calculation of Campaign Intensity Index
Responses to the questions below are grouped into the fol-
lowing core components of constituency campaigning: Pre-
paration, Organisation, Manpower, Computers, Polling
Day Activity, Telephones, Direct Mail, Canvassing, Leaf-
lets and E-Campaigning. These groups are then entered into
a Principal Components Analysis, which produced one
component.
Group Question
Preparation How prepared – Jobs
Preparation How prepared – Campaign funds
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Preparation How prepared – Main committee rooms
Preparation How prepared – Local committee rooms
Preparation How prepared – Electoral register
Preparation How prepared – Election address
Preparation How prepared – Printing
Preparation How prepared – Identifying supporters
Preparation Started serious planning
Preparation Use of previous canvass records
Organization Percentage of const covered by active local
orgs
Organization How long ago knew responsible
Organization Delegated duties – Canvassing organizer
Organization Delegated duties – Postal votes
Organization Delegated duties – Candidate aide
Organization Delegated duties – Computer officer
Organization Local organizers or sub-agents
Manpower Number of campaign workers
Manpower Number of campaign helpers on polling
day
Computers Delegated duties – Computer officer
Computers Use of computers – Direct mail
Computers Use of computers – Canvass returns
Computers Use computerized electoral register
Computers Computers used to compile knock-up lists
Computers Election software provided by party HQ
Polling Day Activity Good morning leaflets delivered
Polling Day Activity Voters knocked up on polling day
Polling Day Activity Percentage of constituency covered
Polling Day Activity Number of campaign helpers on polling day
Polling Day Activity Volunteers sent into your constituency
Telephones Use telephone canvassing in const
Telephones Outside canvassing
Telephones Use telephone canvassing
Telephones Telephone canvassing organized from
outside constituency
Telephones Voters contacted by telephone on polling day
Direct Mail Leaflets targeted at particular groups
Direct Mail Direct mail used to target individual voters
Canvassing Percentage of electorate canvassed
Canvassing Percentage of electorate telephone
canvassed?
Leaflets How many regionally/nationally produced
leaflets distributed
Leaflets Total number of locally produced leaflets
E-Campaigning Pre-election campaign – Operating and
maintaining a website
E-Campaigning Pre-election campaign – Using social
networking sites
E-Campaigning Contact voters in the constituency by text
message
E-Campaigning Make use of Twitter to communicate with
voters
E-Campaigning Use of computers – Emailing voters
E-Campaigning Local party and candidate website
E-Campaigning Campaign effort – Maintaining website
E-Campaigning Campaign effort – Emailing voters
E-Campaigning Campaign effort – Social networking sites
E-Campaigning Campaign effort – Video/image sharing
sites
E-Campaigning Voters contacted by text on polling day
E-Campaigning Voters contacted by email on polling day
Calculation of Other Indexes
Responses to the questions below were included in the cal-
culation of the following scales:
Traditionalism
 No. of posters distributed
 No. of nationally or regionally produced leaflets
distributed
 No. of locally produced leaflets distributed
 Percentage of electorate canvassed on doorstep
 No. of campaign workers
 Knocked up by party workers
 No. of polling day workers
Modernization
 Amount of direct mail sent
 Percentage of electorate telephone canvassed
 Used computers
 Had computerized electoral register
 Used party software
 With website
 Knocked up by telephone
 Used computers for knocking-up lists
E-Campaigning
 Pre-election campaign – Operating and maintaining
a website
 Pre-election campaign – Using social networking
sites
 Contact voters in the constituency by text message
 Make use of Twitter to communicate with voters
 Use of computers – Emailing voters
 Local party and candidate website
 Campaign effort – Maintaining website
 Campaign effort – Emailing voters
 Campaign effort – Social networking sites
 Campaign effort – Video/image sharing sites
 Voters contacted by text on polling day
 Voters contacted by email on polling day
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Notes
1. All candidates are legally obliged to retain an election agent.
The agent is responsible for the organisation and conduct of
the campaign. This survey was sent to election agents of all
candidates in Great Britain from the Conservative Party, the
Labour Party, the Liberal Democrats, Plaid Cymru and the
Scottish National Party standing for election to the Westmin-
ster Parliament.
2. Where there were missing data on individual variables that
formed part of these scales, multiple imputation was used,
which took account of the individual party and the target sta-
tus of the seat.
3. Candidate spending in Britain is limited by law and that limit
varies by the electorate and geography of the district (constit-
uency). Thus, the appropriate measurement of candidate
spending is not the total expenditure, but the percentage of
the maximum permitted. The analyses in this article exclude
the 18 Northern Ireland constituencies plus that being
defended by the Speaker (where the parties traditionally do
not field candidates) and Thirsk and Malton, where the elec-
tion was held later (under different spending limits) because
of the death of a candidate during the short campaign period.
4. The analyses in the article refer only to Britain (England,
Scotland and Wales)
5. We are grateful to Professor Colin Rallings for supplying the
notional turnout data for the 2005 general election.
6. For this model and all others, we also ran the models using
two aggregate level demographic variables as an alternative
to notional turnout in 2005: the percentage of owner occu-
piers in the constituency and the population density (mea-
sured by the number of persons per hectare). These
variables have consistently been useful aggregate level pre-
dictors of turnout and were also employed by Denver and
Hands (1997) in their initial examination of the impact of dis-
trict level campaigning on turnout at the 1992 British General
Election. The results (available on request from the lead
author) were almost identical to the better specified model
using notional turnout as a control.
7. Details of the variables used to create the indexes of tradi-
tional campaigning, modern campaigning and e-campaigning
are shown in the Appendix.
8. Information on which seats were targeted by parties was gath-
ered through qualitative interviews with national party staff
(Fisher et al., 2011a).
9. To guard against any issues of collinearity that could occur
given that most seats will be targeted by more than one party,
these models were also run with results from each single party
alone. The results were identical.
10. The simplified graph actually serves to exaggerate the nega-
tive effect a little as only 4% of Labour candidates in the
party’s non-target seats actually spent 50% or more of the
permitted allowance.
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